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Background: Veterinary infection control for the management of Hendra virus (HeV), an emerging zoonosis in
Australia, remained suboptimal until 2010 despite 71.4% (5/7) of humans infected with HeV being veterinary
personnel or assisting a veterinarian, three of whom died before 2009. The aim of this study was to identify the
perceived barriers to veterinary infection control and HeV management in private veterinary practice in Queensland,
where the majority of HeV outbreaks have occurred in Australia.
Results: Most participants agreed that a number of key factors had contributed to the slow uptake of adequate
infection control measures for the management of HeV amongst private veterinarians: a work culture characterised
by suboptimal infection control standards and misconceptions about zoonotic risks; a lack of leadership and
support from government authorities; the difficulties of managing biosecurity and public health issues from a
private workforce perspective; and the slow pattern of emergence of HeV. By 2010, some infection control and HeV
management changes had been implemented. Participants interviewed agreed that further improvements
remained necessary; but also cautioned that this was a complex process which would require time.
Conclusion: Private veterinarians and government authorities prior to 2009 were unprepared to handle new slowly
emerging zoonoses, which may explain their mismanagement of HeV. Slowly emerging zoonoses may be of low
public health significance but of high significance for specialised groups such as veterinarians. Private veterinarians,
who are expected to fulfil an active biosecurity and public health role in the frontline management of such
emerging zoonoses, need government agencies to better recognise their contribution, to consult with the
veterinary profession when devising guidelines for the management of zoonoses and to provide them with
greater leadership and support. We propose that specific infection control guidelines for the management of
slowly emerging zoonoses in private veterinary settings need to be developed.
Keywords: Veterinarians, Emerging infectious disease, Zoonoses, Hendra virus, Infection control, Management,
Behavioural change, QueenslandBackground
Hendra virus (HeV) is amongst a plethora of zoonoses
emerging as new infectious threats to animal as well as
human health [1]. HeV first emerged in 1994 in Brisbane,
Queensland, Australia [2,3]. HeV is a paramyxovirus
carried by pteropid bats with low infectivity to other
susceptible species [4,5]. However, the virus can sporad-
ically spillover from its natural reservoir to horses with* Correspondence: Diana.Mendez@jcu.edu.au
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unless otherwise stated.secondary spillover to humans in some instances. HeV
has high fatality rates in both species, 75% and 57% re-
spectively [6]. Humans can become infected with HeV
when exposed to blood and bodily fluids from an in-
fected horse [2,3,7-11]. In 2011, a dog became infected
with HeV but did not develop any clinical signs prior to
being sacrificed [12]. Since 1994 there have been a rela-
tively low number (49) of self-limiting outbreaks along
the eastern coast of Australia between northern New
South Wales and Far North Queensland [6]. These out-
breaks resulted in the deaths of 90 horses and a total of
three non-fatal and four fatal human infections [6]. Sol Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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1994 and September 2009 in Queensland [6].
HeV infection in humans can be prevented by avoiding
contact with infected horses or avoiding exposure to in-
fected substances by implementing infection control (IC)
measures such as using personal protective equipment
(PPE) [13]. Administration of monoclonal antibodies dur-
ing the incubation period has been shown to prevent
experimentally induced HeV disease in ferrets and non-
human primate models and this has also been used in
humans exposed to HeV as an experimental prophylaxis
[14]. A vaccine for horses became available in late 2012
and was promoted for the protection of horse populations
from HeV and humans from secondary spillover [15,16].
Since the emergence of HeV the veterinary profession
has paid the highest price with the death of two veteri-
narians, a veterinary assistant and the non-fatal infection
of a veterinarian and a veterinary nurse [2,3,6-11]. As a
result of these HeV-related deaths, Federal and State
governments and professional agencies initiated an IC
and HeV management campaign targeted at equine veter-
inary practices. Despite the early information campaigns
about HeV related risks and risk mitigation strategies tar-
geting private veterinarians, the last two human cases of
HeV occurred as late as 2008 and 2009 and proved fatal
for two veterinarians, one of whom had recently attended
a HeV management workshop [6,9-11]. Additionally, an
Australian study conducted in early 2010 by a State gov-
ernment agency showed that IC and HeV management
practices in private equine veterinary clinics were still sub-
optimal particularly when carrying out high risk proce-
dures (such as dental procedures, endoscopy of the upper
respiratory or urinary tracts or endotracheal intubation)
with high likelihood of exposure to oral, respiratory and
urogenital bodily fluids from a healthy or a sick horse [17].
As a result, government authorities and veterinary profes-
sional agencies questioned why private veterinarians were
still becoming infected with HeV. In mid to late 2010, in
an attempt to promote changes in HeV management and
related IC behaviours, the Queensland government sent a
new comprehensive HeV management information pack-
age to all private veterinarians registered in Queensland
(Dr B. Pott, personal communication).
The aim of this paper is to explore the barriers to IC
and HeV management in private practices prior to
September 2010 as perceived by equine veterinarians
and allied staff in Queensland, Australia.
Methods
Research protocol
The purpose of this qualitative study was to identify and
understand the factors affecting IC and HeV management
in veterinary private practices in Queensland, Australia.
This study was conducted as an exploratory, descriptivedesign using semi-structured interviews. This method was
chosen in order to gain an in-depth understanding of the
perceptions and experiences related to the management
of HeV and IC implementation in private practices in
Queensland [18-20]. No adequate research tool had been
previously developed to conduct such a study in the con-
text of HeV emergence. After consultation with major
stakeholders involved in the management of HeV (private
equine veterinary practitioners, lecturers in equine medi-
cine and representatives from professional and State
government agencies) a series of open-ended interview
questions were formulated to explore HeV related risk
perceptions as well as barriers to IC and HeV manage-
ment in equine veterinary practices in Queensland. The
interview questions were piloted with one equine veter-
inarian and questions modified accordingly.
Between December 2009 and September 2010 individ-
ual, face-to-face interviews were conducted with 21 vet-
erinary personnel from 14 veterinary practices in rural
and urban areas along the eastern coast of Queensland,
Australia. Interviews were semi-structured to allow the
in-depth exploration of issues relating to barriers to IC
and HeV management in the context of their veterinary
work as perceived by the participating veterinary staff
[20]. This project was conducted with the approval of
the James Cook University Human Ethics Committee
(permit H3513) and complied with qualitative research
guidelines on relevance, appropriateness, transparency
and soundness of research methodology (RATS) [21,22].
Recruitment and interview protocols
Participation was voluntary and participants could with-
draw from the study at any time. Prospective suitable
veterinary practices were identified from public phone
directories and their associated advertisements and web
links. Potential participants were initially contacted by
phone, by the lead interviewer (DM), at which time the
purpose and protocol of the study were explained to them
by the researcher. Prospective participants were subse-
quently provided via e-mail with a project information
sheet and explanations about what would be required of
them at the time of the interview. Some declined to par-
ticipate without further explanation while others were
“too busy” or suspicious of the research process. Upon
agreement to participate, a suitable interview date, time
and location for each participant were organised. At the
time of the interviews, the lead interviewer (DM) provided
further information about the project and the study proto-
col when requested by a participant prior to the signing of
the consent form. In particular, many participants were
concerned about retaining anonymity and wished to as-
certain their responses would remain unidentified. This
was assured. Prior to commencing each interview, partici-
pants were required to provide socio-demographic and
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tice they worked in, their role in the practice, an estima-
tion of percentage of their working time spent providing
veterinary services to horses and their experience with
HeV outbreaks. Recruitment of new participants ceased
when data saturation was reached; i.e., interviews stopped
yielding new perspectives. This occurred after interview
number 18.
Participants
The target population were veterinary personnel work-
ing in private practice in Queensland. The eligibility
criteria were: 1) working in private veterinary practice
providing veterinary services to either horses exclusively
(i.e., equine practice) or to horses as well as to other large
and small domestic animals (i.e., mixed practice); 2) work-
ing within the known geographic distribution area of HeV
in Queensland: the eastern coast between the Far North
and the Queensland-New South Wales border [23]. In
order to collect a comprehensive range of views within
the target population, participants, with different socio-
demographic and professional profiles, were purposively
selected from regions where HeV outbreaks had oc-
curred (South East; Central; North; and Far North of
Queensland). The final study population comprised 21
participants from a total of 14 mixed private veterinary
practices. According to the Australia Rural, Remote and
Metropolitan Areas (RRMA) classification system nine
participants were from areas classified as metropolitan,
nine were from rural areas and three were from remote
areas [24]. The majority of participants (18) were veteri-
narians; two were experienced female veterinary nurses
and one was a male practice manager who although hav-
ing no direct involvement with equine patients, worked in
a practice with a strong equine component. In most cases,
the first point of contact during the recruitment process
was the principal veterinarian owner of the practice. More
than half the veterinarians interviewed were principal vet-
erinarians (10) of whom only one was female. Interviews
with principal veterinarians lasted, on average, longer
(75.6 minutes) than interviews with other participants
(46 minutes). The remaining eight veterinarians were part-
ners/associates or employees, five of whom were female.
Females were on average younger and aged between 31
and 48 years old while males were aged between 28 and
63 years old. This was reflected in the difference of the
average number of years since graduation between males
(mean = 26.4 yrs, range: 4–40 yrs) and females (mean =
13.1 yrs; range: 4–27 yrs). Excluding the practice manager,
on average, females spent proportionally less of their
working time than males attending to horse patients
(30.4% vs 52.1%). Prior to this study there had only been
13 confirmed outbreaks of HeV with one outbreak occur-
ring during the data collection period [6]. However, morethan half of the participants (60%) had dealt with at least
one suspected case of equine HeV and over a third (35%)
had dealt with at least one confirmed equine HeV case
prior to being interviewed. Further details of this study
population have been described elsewhere [25-27].
Data collection
For convenience, the majority of interviewees chose to
be interviewed in an office at their place of work or in
their own homes. The interviews were conducted by the
lead author (DM), a female veterinarian with research
skills in qualitative interview techniques, who was well
aware of the issues under investigation, with a research
assistant participating in some interviews. With written
consent from each participant, responses were recorded
as digital audio files with complementary hand written
notes. Participants were asked to share their experiences
when dealing with HeV and what, in their opinion, were
the barriers to IC and WHS compliance. At the conclu-
sion of each interview, the notes were read back to each
participant to give them the opportunity to clarify or
amend their responses. Audio files were later transcribed
and entered into qualitative data analysis software (NVivo
qualitative data analysis software; QSR International Pty
Ltd. Version 9, 2010). After each interview, the interviewer
reviewed the notes and recorded a number of reflections
capturing the context of each interview. Interviews took
between 40 and 160 minutes, with an average time of
64 minutes.
Data analysis
Prior to analysis, each participant was identified using a
unique alphanumeric code (V* for veterinarians, VN* for
veterinary nurses and PM* for practice manager) and a
unique alphanumeric veterinary practice code (P*). The-
matic analysis was used to analyse the qualitative data
[28]. Interview transcripts were analysed with NVivo
(QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 9, 2010) for repeat-
ing units of meaning and the main themes and sub-
themes were conceptualised using inductive thematic
analysis [20,28]. This process was repeated on more than
one occasion with identified themes discussed and agreed
upon by three of the researchers (DM, RS, JK). Two of the
researchers were veterinarians and thus were able to re-
view the themes within the context of private veterinary
practice and the emergence of HeV and its management.
Results
Data analysis revealed six main themes expressing the par-
ticipants’ responses about the difficulties associated with
the implementation of adequate IC and HeV management
in private veterinary practices between the first outbreak
in 1994 and the time of the interviews (2009–2010)
(Table 1).These themes are: the emerging epidemiology of
Table 1 Main themes surrounding the topics of barriers to infection control and Hendra virus management in private
veterinary practices identified in Queensland, Australia, between 2009 and 2010, as illustrated by participants’ quotes
Themes Examples of quotes from participants’ responses which best illustrate the themes
The emerging epidemiology
of the virus
“When the first case of Hendra came about, it was seen as being rare so we didn’t see [it] as a problem.” (V3/Pa)
“It would have been better to have known more about the virus. Where do you draw the line when you don’t know
enough about the risks and the non-risks?” (V4/Pc)
“The drive [for IC*] needs to be continuous…HeV cases are seldom, so it’s easy for people to be slack, to back off from
infection control.” (V10/Pg)
“The biggest challenge is how to manage a hospital facility for horses, because the case definition is not clear…Our
biggest concern…a horse that shows up without Hendra on the differential list and it [HeV#] shows up on the list
later.” (V16/Pl)
“This is a disease that is here to stay….so we have to learn to live with it.” (V15/Pk)
Risk perception determines
risk mitigation
“Some think that Hendra is only a North Queensland problem and that it wouldn’t happen in South Queensland or
northern New South Wales.” (V7/Pa)
“I didn’t think a great deal about it [HeV] because I studied in Victoria and it was presented to us as a disease only
found in Queensland.” (V14/Pj)
“No way in the world would I put a mask or gloves on unless I saw something dramatic.”(V13/Pi)
“You will not get a primary Hendra case with a horse living in a stable.” (V1/Pa)
“At the time [before HeV], human safety was not being kicked [by a horse patient], not being trampled on, avoiding
any physical injury…Zoonoses were not a big one on my list.” (V14/Pj)
“Seeing a mate die I think is enough. Obviously you think of self-preservation. I have a life to live…Dying is a pretty big
cost.” (V5/Pd)
Risk and risk mitigation
communication
“There were no guidelines in place in regards to what [protective] equipment should be worn…there was information
on what samples were needed but not how to take them.” (V14/Pj)
“The trouble with AVA† is that there is only 50% membership…weekends are when the AVA has the workshops and that
is when we have a lot of work on here.” (V15/Pk)
“Most vets would receive information through email. Some think it’s not enough but some of those don’t read their
emails.” (V1/Pa)
“They [people at the DPI‡] are excellent. The DPI is the most authoritative source of knowledge because they have been
dealing with the issues and they are responsible for biosecurity.” (V15/Pk)
“The local DPI were useless, almost burying their heads in the sand. They didn’t have enough knowledge, were unwilling
to investigate and had a lack of resources and people.” (V9/Pf)
“I contacted Biosecurity Queensland on a Saturday afternoon…They transferred me on the phone 19 times to talk to a
vet… they have to realise that private vets work 24/7…This disease is too serious to be ignored…they should have
been more responsive. It would have been easier to put the horse in a hole and forget about it!” (V5/Pd)
“I find great difficulty dealing with owners because it is a power play and ultimately we are responsible for the safety of
all involved but some owners don’t believe that, which compromises the legal situation. We usually end up with less
authority out of concern for the welfare of the animal.” (V4/Pc)
“By the time you get to the horse you are only the 3rd or 4th opinion…A lot of people around here are gung ho who
[think they] know better.” (V5/Pd)
“Some owners burr at the cost…He [the owner] said ‘if you want to test the horse why don’t you pay for it’.” (V14/Pj)
“[The owner said] I don’t want them tested for Hendra. If they turn up positive they’ll have to be put down. My horses
are like my children and I wouldn’t euthanase my own children.” (V9/Pf)
Education and work culture “Students are very well aware of the risks to the point of being scared to do things.” (V7/Pa)
“These days young vets lack confidence around horses because of their lack of experience through their training and
personal life.” (V1/Pa)
“Coming out of Uni the biggest issue was not whether I could follow protocols it was getting the practice of using those
protocols.” (V17/Pm)
“[I]had been inadequately trained [about HeV] when studying in Victoria [another state] …I didn’t realise that interstate
[studies] did not offer the same information. Some things should not be disregarded in the curriculum because it
doesn’t happen in that area.” (V14/Pj)
“Hopefully they [the students] will go into practice in clinics where they follow best practice.” (V7/Pa)
“Poor mentorship is a problem. Training is very important. A principal vet can teach a lot to younger vets.” (V8/Pe)
“I think overall we, as vets, were pretty grubby...to get around with blood on your shirt all day that is just what
veterinarians did.” (V16/Pl)
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(Continued)
“Old school vets always considered getting infected with a zoonosis as a badge of honour.” (V8/Pe)
“The biggest obstacle is trying to retrain someone who has done something a certain way for 30 odd years.” (V13/Pi)
“The culture needs to change…[but]…change won’t happen overnight. Human medicine was hit in the 1980s
[by HIVΩ], it sparked infection control improvement but it’s still not perfect now. The [veterinary] profession has to
change but this will take time.” (V8/Pe)
Use of Personal Protective
Equipment
“If I am going to be completely honest, a few years ago there would be no way I’d put it [PPE◊] on.” (V13/Pi)
“We have always been casual about horses. In cattle you have brucellosis but I have never been worried about catching
anything from horses.” (3/Pa)
“The right PPE … was not available at the clinic at the time. PPE was still not considered to be an issue at the
time.” (V10/Pg)
“You can read the protocol all you like but until you actually do it and take the gear off under the assumption that you
are contaminated it is not an easy thing to do.” (V12/Ph)
“By following the DPI protocol it took us two hours before the animal was finally sedated.” (V4/Pc)
“PPE can be cumbersome…smelling the breath of a horse gives you an idea of what’s going on. If you are wearing a
mask it makes it difficult.” (V11/Pg)
“The ability to move properly…can be a problem. When you have to deal with horses with fractures you have to move
quickly!” (V10/Pg)
“The biggest obstacle: heat and humidity…When you are wearing the full PPE it can be very hot.” (V6/Pa)
“I hate masks, they press on the bottom of my eyes and I can’t see…I won’t wear goggles it’s too difficult with my
glasses.” (V5/Pd)
“Comfort and practicability is an issue for me because one size fits none!!…PPE suits are baggy on me, with a lot of
flapping about and this scares horses.” (V7/Pa)
“During the EI§ campaign I had to vaccinate between 800 and 1000 horses and at each farm I had to put on a new set
of PPE so it’s not a big issue for me.” (V2/Pb)
“Cost is a big one. You have to pass the cost on. The bill can be a lot dearer than before and if the horse turns out
negative, the owner will whinge about the money spent.” (V5/Pd)
“We are lucky in that our clients are used to spending money on their horses.” (V12/Ph)
“It is potentially dangerous…to have two people walk up [to a horse] looking like spacemen with their clothes rustling
and their voices distorted.” (V12/Ph)
“Vets like me don’t want to be seen with over the top PPE…in more rural situations you tend to think you are being a
bit of a Wally[silly] dressed up for minor issues.” (V10/Pg)
“…You felt silly in front of other colleagues to be wearing all the gear.” (V3/Pa)
“Clients could be a driving force behind it [IC] because they would start questioning why some vets use PPE and others
don’t.” (V1/Pa)
Running a private veterinary
practice
“When you have a big backlog of work there is time pressure… your logistics are stretched…many cases end up being
emergency cases at the end of the day, which is a recipe for disaster because you start cutting corners and making
mistakes.” (V4/Pc)
“Vets are often busy and to get through a large case load is hard enough, let alone stopping to put protective gear
on.” (V16/Pl)
“Cost is an issue …Do you then transfer the cost onto the owner? What if the case turns out negative? How do you
justify it?” (VN2/Pe)
“There would be cases out there that have not been reported because of the cost…I think this puts people at risk. As
long as it is hurting the pocket of the clients or the pocket of the vet, cases will go unreported.” (V14/Pj)
“In the hospital system everything is …disposable. If we had to treat everything as disposable our cost would increase…
The industry would suffer from it.” (V3/Pa)
“As vets we don’t have the luxury of the health system behind us to make [IC] decisions, we don’t have a large buying
power… for vets the one size fits all approach doesn’t work”. (V8/Pg)
“You look at the paper trail that they [WHS¥ authorities] say you need to have…you would have to employ somebody
full time for six months to put it in place.” (V12/Ph)
“As an employer you can do everything in your power and you can make all the recommendations but it comes down
to the individual and if the individual doesn’t have Hendra on their mind there is not much you can do.” (V14/Pj)
Mendez et al. BMC Veterinary Research 2014, 10:215 Page 5 of 14
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/10/215
Table 1 Main themes surrounding the topics of barriers to infection control and Hendra virus management in private
veterinary practices identified in Queensland, Australia, between 2009 and 2010, as illustrated by participants’ quotes
(Continued)
“Legally the only way you could send a staff to a property is if on the day the employer went to that property and
addressed the risks and said it was safe to work there, because the conditions from yesterday might not apply
today.” (V9/Pf)
“More positive cases are going to land in our hospitals…Infection control is imperative but what scares me is the
unknown [when HeV is not readily suspected].” (V16/Pl)
“The DPI‡ contacted me to do this work and they weren’t being flexible about it: they wanted me there and then. This
was [8 months ago] …I am still waiting for my money! Next they'd have to pay me up front.” (V5/Pd)
“Everyone’s fear is you’ll act to the best of your ability and you’ll act in the best interest of everyone involved but later
your actions will be audited by someone who has never worked in a vet practice and has no idea of the pressures at
play and who will apply the letter of the law and potentially cost you your livelihood.” (V12/Ph)
“I don’t talk to local [WHS] officers anymore because they don’t have enough knowledge. This immediately established a
low level of credentials with us. Everything after that we see it more as an inconvenience.” (V8/Pe)
*IC: Infection control; #HeV: Hendra virus; †AVA: Australian Veterinary Association; ‡DPI: Department of Primary Industries; ΩHIV: Human Immunodeficiency Virus;
◊PPE: Personal protective equipment; §EI: Equine influenza; ¥WHS: Workplace health and safety.
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risk mitigation communication; education and work cul-
ture; personal protective equipment; and running a private
veterinary practice.
Each theme included a number of subthemes that are il-
lustrated in Table 1 by selected quotes from participants’
responses. The quotes included in Table 1 were selected
as best illustrations of the themes and subthemes identi-
fied in this study.
The emerging epidemiology of the virus
Many participants were initially not overly concerned
about HeV; the sporadic occurrence of equine cases and
the rarity of human cases separated by long periods of
time belied the seriousness of the epidemic. When HeV
first emerged, participants reported that they and others
in the profession failed to recognise the significance of
this new zoonosis. Most participants felt that in the first
few years of HeV emergence, there was insufficient know-
ledge about the disease and its epidemiology to adequately
assess and therefore manage the risks involved. Neverthe-
less, when HeV began recurring more regularly, partici-
pants started implementing HeV management strategies,
although these strategies were not always sustained over
time. Another major stumbling block identified by many
participants was the difficulty associated with the clinical
diagnosis of the disease in horses. As some participants
pointed out, the case-definition of HeV is non-specific
and there can be substantial variations in clinical presenta-
tions which rendered the initiation of a HeV management
plan difficult. Furthermore, an asymptomatic horse did
not always equate to a healthy uninfected horse as it could
be in the late incubation period of the disease during
which viral shedding is possible. In 2010, however, most
participants agreed that HeV was likely to recur in the fu-
ture and that they needed to adopt a sustainable HeV
management plan.Risk perception determines risk mitigation
Participants who failed to mitigate the HeV-related risks
often perceived the risk of being exposed to HeV to be
low. Their risk perceptions were initially based on geo-
graphic consideration. This viewpoint echoed that of other
participants who recalled that prior to 2010 there was an
ongoing belief that occurrence of HeV would be restricted
to specific geographic areas outside of which the likeli-
hood of HeV spilling over was low as was the risk of ex-
posure. This belief seemed to be perpetuated outside the
initial affected state of Queensland. Participants who had
studied or started their career in other states were not
overly concerned about HeV.
Hendra virus was generally perceived to be a more sig-
nificant risk by participants if they initially included it in
their differential diagnosis, which in turn determined their
HeV management attitudes. However, many participants
reported that prior to the last fatal human case in 2009,
they did not perceive the HeV-related risk to be high un-
less the symptomatology of a horse was severe and that
they would only have considered taking precautions in
extreme clinical cases. Some participants were confident
they could rule out HeV, and the related risks, on clinical
examination alone despite HeV having a non-specific case
definition. Another common belief amongst participants
was that HeV could only spillover into horses kept in pad-
docks and therefore, examining a horse kept in a stable
represented a low HeV risk.
Participants also prioritised risk management accord-
ing to risk likelihood. Because of their experience prior
to the emergence of HeV, many participants perceived the
risk of contracting an infectious disease in equine practice
significantly lower than sustaining a serious injury from a
horse. Conversely, the HeV-related infectious risk ap-
peared to be of greater relevance for participants who had
had direct dealings with early HeV positive cases or per-
sonally knew one of the people who had been infected
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with one of the early outbreaks, became more circumspect
when dealing with sick horses; while another participant
was reconsidering the viability of managing equine cases
after losing a close colleague to HeV.
Risk and risk mitigation communication
At the time this study was conducted, participants were
seeking and receiving information about the HeV from
government and professional agencies such as the depart-
ment of primary industries (DPI)/Biosecurity Queensland,
the Australian Veterinary Association (AVA) and Equine
Veterinarians Australia (EVA). However, not all informa-
tion was perceived as complete, useful, specific or practical
enough in assisting them with HeV management in the
field. Additionally, not all information was accessible by all
veterinarians. Some modes of information delivery, such
as emails, were described as being ineffective in reaching
the entirety of its target population; and professional asso-
ciations could only reach their veterinary membership.
The majority of participants from or around large urban
centres were mostly satisfied with the support they re-
ceived from government agencies in charge of biosecurity.
In contrast, participants from rural and remote areas were
mostly dissatisfied with the level of support they received
from the local representatives of the same government
agencies. Government officers from these areas were per-
ceived as lacking capacity, knowledge and experience.
Some participants from rural and remote areas further
cautioned that the lack of responsiveness from the gov-
ernment at the local level could lead in some instances
to potential cases of HeV going unreported and/or un-
investigated.
Risk and risk mitigation communication also occurred
between veterinary staff and horse owners. Some partici-
pants found risk communication with horse owners chal-
lenging as some clients were not receptive to veterinary
directives about HeV-related risks. Many participants
thought that the three main reasons for horse owners to
refuse veterinary decisions were due to denial of the risk,
cost issues and emotional attachment between owners
and their animals.
Education and work culture
Australian and overseas educated early career veterinar-
ians who worked in the participating practices were
mostly perceived by interviewees as being well informed
about IC and HeV related risks. However, a number of
participants thought that some undergraduate Australian
veterinary students and newly graduated veterinarians
lacked experience and confidence in applying IC and ani-
mal handling skills. Some participants recalled their own
lack of confidence in applying IC principles earlier in their
career which they thought was due to insufficient practicalexperience and variability in veterinary curricula between
universities.
Other participants questioned the role of senior private
veterinarians overseeing the practical training of veterinary
students on extramural placements and early career veter-
inarians. Professional mentorship was reported as having a
pivotal effect on veterinary IC training. In some instances,
poor professional mentorship was deemed responsible for
undergraduate students and early career veterinarians fail-
ing to adopt and develop adequate IC standards.
Participating senior veterinarians thought that their IC
attitudes and beliefs about veterinary occupational risks,
which were now considered suboptimal, were the norm
at the beginning of their career. This enduring work cul-
ture was viewed as a major obstacle to IC improvement
in veterinary practice as it required a drastic change in
the way veterinarians thought, behaved and made deci-
sions. However, most participants, regardless of how long
they had worked in private practice, recognised that veter-
inary IC required amelioration but warned that it would
take some time before this occurred.
Use of personal protective equipment (PPE)
A number of participants, who began their career before
the emergence of HeV, pointed out that prior to 1994
the use of PPE in equine practice was not a common oc-
currence. Some thought the lack of experience with zoo-
notic risk in equine practice led to the belief that the use
of PPE for the management of HeV was not critical. By
2010 all participants were using some form of PPE in
combination with other IC strategies to mitigate the risk
of exposure to HeV and/or other zoonoses. However,
some participants still found it difficult to use PPE rou-
tinely in equine practice. Participants gave a range of rea-
sons why they thought the use of PPE presented some
drawbacks: it sometimes hindered their ability to work
efficiently, competently, safely and comfortably; or was
deemed unsuitable for reasons of fit. Interestingly, partici-
pants who had repeatedly used PPE during the equine
influenza outbreaks and vaccination campaigns did not
perceive the use of PPE in equine practice to be an issue.
Some participants also thought that the systematic use
of PPE had the disadvantage of increasing the running
cost of a consultation which affected the veterinary prac-
tice as well as the client, although not all participants
viewed the added PPE-related cost as a big issue.
A number of participants were also concerned about
the way they were perceived by their patients, clients and
colleagues when they wore PPE and the effect this would
have on their workplace health and safety (WHS) and
their professional credibility. Other participants thought
that the clients who perceived the use of PPE as positive
work practice could be a driving force behind equine vet-
erinary practices more readily adopting the use PPE.
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Time management was an issue for most veterinarians
interviewed who reported that implementing additional
IC measures affected work schedule, quality and safety.
The extra time spent implementing additional IC mea-
sures was also reported to affect consultation fees. Many
participants further explained that any additional cost,
such as costs related to the management of HeV, needed
to be justifiable to clients as it often affected their level
of satisfaction with veterinary services provided. Cost
was perceived by many participants as a limiting factor
to the management of HeV from a client’s and a busi-
ness perspective.
Some participants highlighted the discrepancies that
existed between the business models of veterinary prac-
tices and public medical hospitals for people. They pointed
out that veterinary practices were small businesses operat-
ing solely privately unlike medical hospitals and therefore
could not be run as sustainably because of cost and logis-
tical considerations.
Many participants were principal veterinarians who had
the added responsibility of ensuring that the running of
their practice, including the management of potential HeV
cases, complied with the WHS legislation. However, many
found that compliance was not easily achieved and in
some instances hindered the running of the practice. The
need to document WHS policies and procedures, training
and incidents, for example, was perceived as unwelcomed
extra work. The need to ensure the health and safety of
staff who were not always receptive to warnings and in-
struction was viewed as another major challenge to com-
pliance. Some participants thought that the legislation was
open to interpretation; thus making it difficult to always
comply. Many participants also felt that because compli-
ance was not legally protective they remained vulnerable
to unexpected situations. Although, most participants
were aware that they could legally refuse to provide veter-
inary services if they deemed a situation unsafe, some
were not afforded this option when being requested to
fulfil HeV management duties on behalf of the govern-
ment without receiving logistic support or compensation
for their skilled services. Additionally, some participants
thought that scrutiny of veterinary practices by WHS au-
thorities was often inadequate and arbitrary to the detri-
ment of their businesses.
Discussion
Private veterinarians are likely to be the first frontline
clinicians to encounter emerging zoonoses; which puts
them at a higher occupational risk of exposure to these
diseases [1,29]. Many studies, including Australian stud-
ies, have shown veterinarians’ attitudes and behaviours
towards IC and zoonotic risks to be suboptimal; how-
ever, most studies have failed to explain why this was so[30-34]. The aim of this study was not to evaluate veter-
inary IC adequacy but to identify and understand the
barriers to IC and zoonotic risk mitigation in private vet-
erinary practices within the context of the emergence of
HeV in Queensland, Australia. Participants reported ex-
periencing difficulties implementing IC and HeV manage-
ment for a number of reasons (Table 1). Many of these
issues were interconnected and were in actual fact related
to four main barriers to IC and HeV management dis-
cussed below: veterinary work culture; private workforce
managing biosecurity and public health issues; role of gov-
ernment; and uncertainty about the epidemiology of an
emerging disease (Table 2).
Strengths and limitations
Between December 2009 and September 2010, the issues
surrounding veterinary IC and HeV management were
sensitive topics amongst private veterinarians, as two of
their colleagues had died of HeV in the previous two years
[6,9-11]. Following these events private equine practices
came under a high level of government scrutiny. As a re-
sult, prospective participants were reluctant to take part in
the study. They were concerned their responses would be
misunderstood, misrepresented and/or misused. Those
who agreed to participate may have had “stronger views
on” or “interest in” veterinary IC and HeV management
because they had had experience with HeV or biosecurity
and WHS government authorities; or because they were
principal veterinarians, owners of their practice. Although
data were collected over 10 months, the topics brought to
the fore during the interviews were very similar and
mostly related to veterinary IC and HeV management is-
sues participants had experienced prior to 2010. Many of
the views expressed by participants were corroborated
by the findings of other reports about HeV management
[35-37]. The chief investigator (RS) and the main inter-
viewer (DM) are both veterinarians who were able to
communicate with participants as colleagues who under-
stood the context of their workplace. Consequently, par-
ticipants were more open about their experiences and
beliefs, which made for richer data. However, coding and
thematic analysis were pursued without any preconceived
construct other than the knowledge the researchers had of
veterinary workplaces, allowing an in-depth understanding
of the issues raised by participants.
Veterinary work culture
Most participants agreed that, as a whole, the veterinary
profession had initially been reluctant to adopt new IC
strategies for the management of HeV because it re-
quired a significant shift in their work culture. Retro-
spectively, they felt unprepared to deal with an emerging
zoonosis. They all agreed that when HeV first emerged
veterinary IC was not optimal and needed improvement.
Table 2 Summary of main barriers to infection control and Hendra virus management in private veterinary practices in
Queensland, Australia, up until September 2010
Main issues Related barriers
Work culture • Longstanding observance of suboptimal IC practices;
• Veterinarians’ perception that zoonotic risks in equine veterinary practice were low;
• Veterinarians’ perception that they are more likely to be exposed to injury risks than infectious risks in
equine practice;
• Mitigation of injury risks more readily implemented by veterinarians than mitigation of infectious risks
in equine practice;
• Inadequate veterinary work habits perpetrated in some instances by poor professional mentorship during
extramural undergraduate placement or during early career experiences.
Role of Government • Suboptimal HeV testing pathways
• Slow response from government authorities to the emergence of HeV and to HeV outbreaks
• Suboptimal and conflicting communication of risk and risk mitigation from government authorities
to veterinarians
• Inconsistent government support for veterinarians throughout the state, with rural remote areas receiving
less skilled technical support
• Difficulties in complying and collaborating with WHS legislation and authorities
Managing animal and public health
issues and a private business
• The logistical, financial and work time costs of implementing infection control changes within the context
of running small private businesses
• Difficulty in interpreting and enforcing WHS regulation
• Mitigation of zoonotic risks interfering with the mitigation of injury risks
• Lack of WHS legal protection when a third party breaches the legislation
• Veterinarians’ lack of experience choosing and using some of the PPE recommended
• Inadequate, insufficient and inconsistent training of undergraduate veterinarians about IC and
HeV management
• Difficulty in implementing IC behavioural changes amongst veterinary staff
• Difficulty inefficiently communicating with clients about HeV-related risks and risk mitigation
recommendations
Uncertainty about the epidemiology
of an emerging disease
• Slow emergence and sporadic nature of HeV outbreaks
• Slow gathering and dissemination of epidemiological information
• Misinterpretation of epidemiological information
• Non-specific HeV case definition
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manage HeV. A 2010 government study conducted within
the same target population also concluded that IC for the
management of HeV still needed amelioration [17]. How-
ever, participants cautioned this process would take time.
By 2009–2010, all participants had made some improve-
ments to their IC and HeV management strategies; some
only recently while others had not been sustained long
term. According to the hierarchy of control of health and
safety risks which categorises risk mitigation strategies,
the changes implemented varied greatly, with some partic-
ipants implementing only low levels of control (using add-
itional PPE); while others addressed IC issues at a much
higher level of control (attending specialised training,
developing new standard protocols and policies, seeking
new engineered solutions) [38]. A few participants were
still sceptical of the appropriateness of the recom-
mended changes.Successfully changing work culture in human healthcare
settings has been described as a lengthy and complex
process requiring strong leadership within an organisation
[39,40]. The adoption of effective hand hygiene by health-
care workers is a good example. While hand hygiene was
recognised in the late 1800s as the simplest and most ef-
fective IC measure that could help prevent healthcare
associated infections, it remains a practice that is nei-
ther consistently nor adequately carried out by health-
care workers despite healthcare systems being strongly
supported by government leadership [41]. In comparison,
the push for veterinarians to adopt new HeV-related IC
measures only dates from the last decade. Veterinarians
communicated about HeV risk mitigation within and be-
tween practices via an informal professional network;
however, most participants felt that government agencies
in charge of biosecurity could have provided more leader-
ship and support to the veterinary profession. Instead, the
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was fragmented and vested in each principal veterinarian,
the owner of his/her practice.
Private workforce managing biosecurity and public health
issues
Maintaining the financial viability and credentials of the
veterinary practice, a small privately owned business,
was a concern for all principal veterinarians and some
senior veterinary employees interviewed. In their view
any change in work habits/protocols could affect the
business, presumably because of the perception that in
private veterinary practice there is a cost ceiling and any
additional cost would decrease profit. Profitability of the
business is a common concern of veterinarians running
private practices of all types [42,43]. The constraints of
running a private business significantly influenced par-
ticipants’ decisions about IC, and some found it difficult
to balance their de facto public health and biosecurity
roles while running a private business and complying
with their WHS responsibilities. The WHS legislation,
for example, was viewed as open to interpretation and
difficult to implement in unpredictable circumstances
not easily controlled. The difficulties of using some stand-
ard biosecurity measures in the field in equine practice are
common to the management of other equine infectious
diseases [44]. Some participants were aware that they
could legally refuse provision of services if they deemed a
situation unsafe [45]. However this option was considered
as a last resort as it could jeopardise the welfare of ani-
mals, translate into loss of immediate income and future
income if unsatisfied clients did not return to the practice.
Refusing to provide veterinary services was not an option
for participants who reported having been requested to
fulfil HeV management duties on behalf of the govern-
ment. For some, the weight of the legal responsibilities
reached breaking point when HeV started to emerge,
resulting in them choosing to exit equine veterinary prac-
tice [25]. So, although fear of dying acted as a significant
motivator for some participants to implement lasting IC
changes, the complexity of their responsibilities to their
patients, clients, colleagues, business and the community
deterred them from doing so.
Role of the government
Many participants perceived government authorities’ slow
response to the emergence of HeV as a sign of unpre-
paredness to deal with emerging zoonoses, which contrib-
uted to the slow uptake of new IC measures for the
management of HeV management by private veterinar-
ians. The subsequent increased scrutiny into veterinary
practices by biosecurity and WHS government agencies
was perceived by most participants as intrusive and an in-
dication that they were regarded as the sole responsiblefor all HeV management shortcomings until 2010. How-
ever, most participants thought the government could
have better contributed to the management of HeV out-
breaks. An Ombudsman’s report about government re-
sponse to HeV outbreaks concurred with this view [37]:
prior to 2009 government agencies in charge of biosecur-
ity failed to develop, finalise and implement their policies
for the management of HeV and adequately train their
staff accordingly. This was reported to have resulted in the
communication of incomplete and conflicting information
and poor field support of private veterinarians, despite
previous independent reports identifying similar issues for
the 2008 and 2009 outbreaks [35,36]. Investigation into
the handling of equine influenza, an equine specific emer-
ging disease in Australia in 2007, also showed the import-
ance of risk communication from government to private
veterinarians when managing emerging infectious diseases
[46]. Many of the recommendations from the various
reports about the management of HeV have since been
adopted by the relevant government agencies [47]. Since
2010 no veterinary personnel have been infected, although
equine cases have increased [6]. This may indicate that
the provision of early leadership and committed support
by government authorities to the veterinary profession
may be key to implement more effective management
plans of emerging zoonoses from both a biosecurity and
a public health perspective.
Uncertainty about the epidemiology of an emerging
disease
The lack of preparedness was a major stumbling block
in the early management of HeV by veterinarians and
government authorities. The slow pattern of HeV emer-
gence appears to have been a contributing factor in
delaying the response of both the private and public sec-
tors in charge of HeV management. The practice of IC
for HeV management is a matter of biosecurity to pro-
tect animal health, of public health and of occupational
health and safety. However, deciding to adopt adequate
IC strategies and behaviours when managing HeV cases
is a matter of personal health choice. Social scientists
have developed various cognitive models to help predict
health behaviours by examining a number of cognitive
skills: knowledge, motivation, readiness to change behav-
iour, expected outcomes, risk perception, perception of peer
behaviour and beliefs about peer opinion of targeted be-
haviour [48]. When HeV first emerged many of these
variables would not have scored highly amongst private
veterinarians. Veterinarians have been shown to make
evidence-based IC decisions [49]. With HeV outbreaks oc-
curring sporadically up until 2010 (13 self-limiting out-
breaks with more than four years between the second and
third outbreaks and the third and fourth outbreaks) [6],
there were few opportunities to gain epidemiological and
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the disease. The full spectrum of clinical signs in horses,
non-specific for the most part, was revealed over decades.
As more cases accumulated it became obvious that in-
fected horses could also excrete virus during the incuba-
tion period [50]. With such a high clinical variability,
equine HeV could only be confirmed by laboratory tests, a
process that was not deemed straightforward by all veteri-
narians [26]. Many participants felt that although they
understood the principles of zoonotic risk mitigation, they
generally lacked experience dealing with emerging zoo-
noses in equine practice. Thus, HeV-related risk percep-
tion, motivation and readiness for IC behavioural change
was low during this time, even though during the first two
outbreaks three people became infected, two fatally. Par-
ticipants’ behaviours seemed to have also been influenced
by: peer perceptions; beliefs about IC and zoonoses; and a
strong professional identity based on the long standing
belief that using PPE was a sign of weakness and that
acquiring a zoonosis was an achievement not a reflec-
tion of malpractice [51]. These beliefs may have beenFigure 1 Veterinary Hendra virus management behaviour model, ada
Model based on results of a qualitative study investigating barriers to infec
veterinary practice in Queensland, Australia, conducted with 21 participantsstronger amongst older participants who had graduated
longer ago as they are likely to have received less theor-
etical and practical biosecurity than those who graduate
more recently [44].
Veterinarians and government actions and decisions
relating to the management of HeV followed the typical
stages of behaviour change: pre-contemplation (behav-
ioural change seen as not needed); contemplation (be-
havioural change under consideration); preparation (for
behavioural change); action (behavioural change implemen-
tation);maintenance (of behavioural change); transcendence
(behavioural change becomes the new behavioural norm);
and sometimes relapse (reverting to old behaviours)
[52,53]. The progression through these stages is deter-
mined by a number of cognitive variables (Figure 1). In
the context of the emergence of HeV, there was at first
disbelief that HeV would recur or spread to other areas,
and as the government did not recommend any particular
changes, veterinary IC behaviours remained unchanged.
With recurring HeV outbreaks and additional human in-
fections, there was a slow recognition that changes topted from trans-theoretical model of health behaviour change.
tion control behaviour relevant to Hendra virus management in private
during 2009–2010 [52,53].
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by some veterinarians but these were not always sustained
as the required financial and logistic investment could not
be justified long-term because of the low frequency of
HeV outbreak and the lack of government commitment to
a clear HeV management plan. The deaths of two veteri-
narians in 2008 and 2009 triggered government into fina-
lising their HeV management plan, formulate and widely
distribute clear recommendations to private veterinarians
and provide more training and field support to equine vet-
erinarians through their emergency response unit. In 2010
all private veterinarians registered in Queensland, received
a comprehensive information package from the govern-
ment. The last three participants to be interviewed for this
study had received this package prior to their interview
and they were mostly satisfied with this information.
Since then there have been no further human infections
with HeV even though, in the winter of 2011, there was
a marked increase in the number of HeV outbreaks in
Queensland and northern New South Wales. Thus, the
changes made by the government and the private veteri-
narians appear to have lowered the risk of human ex-
posure and therefore infection risks for veterinarians
and the wider population.
Conclusion
Unlike other zoonoses, which emerged rapidly in human
populations causing epidemics (e.g., severe acute respira-
tory syndrome (SARS), swine influenza (H1N1) in 2009),
HeV was slow to emerge, the index cases occurred in
horses rather than in humans and HeV did not affect pub-
lic health on a grand scale. Unlike SARS and swine influ-
enza, HeV is a low-incidence high-consequence pathogen
[54]. This type of slow emerging zoonosis, which only
affects human health occasionally, comes with its own set
of unique challenges. Because they recur infrequently, re-
main geographically localised or have a limited effect on
public health, the health risk they pose to humans may be
difficult to assess. However, there is a need to recognise
the potential significance of this type of zoonosis earlier
and implement risk mitigation measures accordingly.
Failing to do so, may put people at risk, in particular pro-
fessionals such as farmers, zoo and wildlife carers, and vet-
erinarians who may come in contact with an infected
animal. However, it would be unrealistic to mobilise the
same level of resources used for the management of zoo-
noses such as SARS or swine influenza. Nevertheless, it
may be possible to develop a template framework for
the management of slowly emerging zoonoses, which
could include: improving veterinary IC and emerging
zoonoses management preparedness through education;
better communication between government authorities,
veterinarians and the public; better recognition of the
biosecurity and public health role and services providedby private veterinarians; consultation with private veter-
inarians when developing zoonoses management plans
compatible with running private practices; a clearer def-
inition of the respective roles of government, profes-
sional agencies and private veterinarians using officially
ratified agreements; and better and equitable government
support for the management of emerging zoonoses to all
private veterinarians across all affected geographic areas.
A closer collaboration and mutual understanding between
private veterinarians and government could be the key to
improving adaptability of both parties to slowly emerging
or infrequent zoonoses.
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